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ABSTRACT Understood as the need to address state crimes committed under the 
previous regime, a global norm of transitional justice has emerged since the end of the 
Cold War. Combined with the postwar resurgence of international law and institutions, 
this has resulted the increasing use of international criminal tribunals to prosecute state-
sponsored human rights violations. I argue that such tribunals are inadequate vehicles for 
justice because they are divorced from the affected communities and conceive of 
historical justice too narrowly in legal terms. Building on the discursive cosmopolitanism 
of Jrgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib, I contend that respecting local traditions and 
desires is crucial to achieving justice in local communities. I lay the groundwork for a 
contextual universalism that respects international legal norms while stimulating 
discourse in the community where they occurred, so that victims and perpetrators can 
once again live together as members of the same polity. 
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Introduction 
The increasing ability of external forces to impinge on the internal affairs of 
formally independent political communities is a profound challenge to the traditional 
understanding of states as autonomous sovereign entities. This loss of steering capacity is 
visible across a variety of issues, ranging from fiscal policy, where the International 
Monetary Fund increasingly dictates policy to debtors, to migration and climate change, 
which highlight the porous nature of national borders. Mark Mazower (2012, p. 421) 
points out that this Ômultifaceted erosion of sovereignty is a momentous changeÕ in world 
politics. 
Among its other consequences, the Ôhollowing outÕ (Tooze 2014, p. 5) of 
sovereignty has transformed international law from a lofty ideal into an enforceable 
reality (Kelsen 1944, p. 35). This shift is particularly visible in international criminal law. 
Most obviously, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which protected state officials from 
prosecution, has increasingly become a historical artifact. The trials of Serbian President 
Slobodan Milošević and Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) testify to a remarkable Ôrevolution in accountabilityÕ 
(Sriram 2003, pp. 310-429). They reflect the emergence of a Ôglobal justice normÕ 
(Lamont 2011, p. 477) that makes state representatives liable for international crimes. 
Although domestic courts have also prosecuted some leaders, much of the literature 
on the Ôjustice cascadeÕ (Sikkink 2011, p. 342) focuses on international tribunals. For 
legal scholars, ÔThe spread of international criminal justice is indeed one of the few major 
achievements of the world communityÕ (Cassese 2011, p. 272). This enthusiasm is shared 
by many political scientists, who argue that this mandate Ôshould be given to the UN, 
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preferably through the creation of a permanent International Criminal CourtÕ (ICC) 
(Mendlovitz and Fousek 1996, p. 142). Political theorists have also welcomed 
international tribunals as a means for reducing the arbitrary protection sovereignty has 
historically offered to war criminals (De Greiff 1998; Beitz 1991). Proponents of a strong 
cosmopolitanism have therefore made the ICC a key component of their call for global 
democratic governance (Kuper 2004; Held 2002). 
Over the last few decades the justifications for war crimes trials have become 
increasingly results-based (Vinjamuri 2010, pp. 198-201). However, the empirical 
evidence for international tribunals is mixed, regardless of how success is measured. On 
one hand, Tricia Olson, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reitner (2010, p. 210) argue that 
international tribunals have negative effect on democracy and human rights, especially 
when used in isolation. On the other hand, Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink (2010) 
have found that prosecutions have a positive influence on human rights conduct, which 
increases even further if these trials are accompanied by truth commissions. Most of the 
time, therefore, judgments regarding the success of international tribunals must be made 
individually for each specific case. 
I welcome the development of international criminal law insofar as it encourages 
the development of a Kantian Ôglobal domestic policyÕ (Weltinnenpolitik). However, I am 
wary of the growing embrace of international criminal tribunals because they are 
divorced from the local context in which the atrocities occurred and deny the agency of 
the communities in question. Additionally, hese high-profile trials often replace or hijack 
local efforts at societal reconciliation, making international prosecutions into the sole 
mechanism of historical justice. As such, they become as much about historical truth and 
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memory as they are about legal justice. This relation was made explicit in the case of the 
ICTY, which argued that although the court was Ôincapable of rendering justice here,Õ it 
could at least ensure that Ôthe truth could be uttered in front of the judges and the victims, 
recognized as such, in front of the worldÕ (in Hazan 2000, p. 134). 
Although this is a noble goal, Martti Koskenniemi notes that truth and memory are 
not Ôsomething that can be authoritatively fixed by a legal processÕ (2002, p. 34). Hannah 
Arendt (2006, p. 251) argues that making international criminal tribunals into 
mechanisms of truth and memory is a mistake, since Ôthe purpose of the trial is to render 
justice, and nothing else.Õ However, as Karl Jaspers (in 1992, p. 410) notes in a letter to 
Arendt, such trials are completely inadequate even in terms of justice, since the accused 
Ôstand outside the pale of what is comprehensible.Õ He argues, ÔSomething other than the 
law is at stake here Ð and to address it in legal terms is a mistake.Õ 
I do not go as far as Jaspers in seeing international criminal prosecutions as a 
mistake tout court. On the contrary, I argue that such trials are an important part of 
historical justice, but only a part. My basic thesis is that international norms against 
impunity should be implemented domestically, taking local attitudes, mechanisms and 
traditions into account. Openness to the domestic level and to the fact that prosecution is 
not necessarily the be all end all of historical justice will help both the international and 
the local communities to break out of the bifurcation Ôbetween impunity and show trialsÕ 
(Koskenniemi 2002). 
In contrast to the one-size-fits-all blueprint of international criminal tribunals, I 
propose a more flexible approach to the duties and obligations generated by the emerging 
global justice norm. Building on the discursive cosmopolitanism of Jrgen Habermas and 
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Seyla Benhabib, I hold that historical justice should aim to repair the ability of citizens to 
recognize their mutual humanity, allowing them to live together in a shared polity. 
Following Jos Alvarez (1999, p. 469), I argue that historical justice should seek Ôto 
provoke socially desirable, if contentious, conversations in the hope that through honest 
discourse the guilty will eventually come to recognize that brutal killings are not morally 
ambiguous.Õ In fulfilling the goal of social reconciliation, these deliberations may result 
in support for prosecutions in international criminal tribunals. However, they may also 
end up endorsing other mechanisms, such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
(TRCs), truth-telling initiatives and individual bans from public life on the European 
model of lustration (Rožič and Nisnevič 2016). 
My critique of international criminal tribunals is not based on a normative account 
of the difficulties involved in holding individuals to account for past crimes. Instead, as a 
critical theorist I start by identifying the problems that exist in contemporary social 
practices. Following the ÔimpureÕ (Williams 2006, p. 155) theoretical approach developed 
by the Frankfurt School, the first part of my argument examines the empirical pathologies 
revealed by the activities of the ICTY and ICTR. This Ôcritical diagnosis of the timesÕ 
(Zeitdiagnose) (Honneth 2004), shows how the physical, administrative, legal and 
emotional distance of the ICTY and the ICTR from local communities inhibited their 
ability to serve as effective vehicles of historical justice. Although the creation of the ICC 
as a permanent tribunal has ameliorated some of the problems I identify in my 
Ôexplanatory-diagnosticÕ (Benhabib 1986, p. 226) analysis, many of these issues persist. 
I build my argument on an internal or immanent understanding of the goals that 
international criminal law has set for itself. Following Max Pensky (2008, p. 2), I 
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understand the development of international tribunals as signaling Ônot just the 
establishment of a new class of international crimes but [of] a legal and political norm 
against impunity.Õ This norm does not necessarily require the prosecution of such crimes 
Ð whether domestically or internationally Ð but instead signals that amnesties Ôare to be 
understood as incompatible with international criminal law.Õ Although it requires that 
action be taken against the perpetrators of international crimes Ð how exactly these 
crimes are defined lies outside the scope of my argument (Renzo 2012) Ð in practice it 
serves as an anti-impunity or anti-amnesty norm. 
After identifying the Ôsystemic dysfunctions and antinomiesÕ (Mrkus 1980b, p. 12) 
involved in this internationalist approach to transitional justice, I seek to identify Ôcritical-
practicalÕ (1980a, p. 81) solutions that meet Ôthe needs and demands expressed by social 
actors in the presentÕ (Benhabib 1986, p. 226). In part two I introduce the discourse 
theories of Habermas and Benhabib in order to develop a culturally sensitive framework 
for mediating between the international duty to hold the individuals responsible to 
account for their crimes and the needs of the local community. I argue that this contextual 
universalism can help to resolve the empirical pathologies of existing approaches to 
international criminal law. 
The third section then proceeds to examine how these theoretical insights can be 
integrated into historical justice through a historical learning process. While other 
approaches to historical justice might also fulfill the requirements of the anti-amnesty 
norm, I focus on how national trials and international prosecutions conducted in the local 
context, such as the postwar trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo, are often able to more 
effectively promote the cross-party dialogue necessary for social reconciliation within the 
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local community where the injustices occurred. Finally, the conclusion argues that 
although international trials may be necessary in certain cases, such tribunals should be 
based in the local jurisdiction and must remain sensitive to the needs and desires of the 
local population. 
 
Diagnosis: The Deficits of International Tribunals 
International lawyers working within the legalist paradigm, such as Antonio 
Cassese (1998, p. 4), the first President of the ICTY, have championed international 
criminal tribunals as reflecting a Ôspirit of relative optimismÕ within the Ônew global 
order.Õ Despite his support for this project, he highlights a number of difficulties. These 
include the excessive reliance on Ôthe goodwill of statesÕ (1998, pp. 10-1) to arrest and 
deliver indicted individuals to the court, the difficulties these tribunals face in building 
the physical (courtrooms and detention units), legal (rules and precedents) and 
institutional (witness protection, investigative teams, etc.) architecture in which 
prosecutions can take place, and their problems establishing jurisdiction and legitimacy 
due to their physical distance from the events. 
The issue of distance is perhaps the most obvious factor inhibiting international 
tribunals from Ôfulfill[ing] the moral requirements of justiceÕ (Schwan 1998, p. 489). It is 
true that domestic law occasionally allows prosecutions to be moved in order to insure 
their objectivity. However, judges are reluctant to allow such changes, as Ôtrials are 
undermined and not merely rendered more difficult the greater the distance between their 
venue and the location of witnesses and evidenceÕ (Alvarez 1999, p. 403). These 
problems are compounded in international tribunals, which operate without the power to 
arrest suspects and subpoena witnesses. 
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Distance also has important psychological consequences. Local trials and other 
mechanisms transitional justice, such as TRCs, which allow victims to sit in on their 
proceedings, send a powerful symbolic message by putting the powerless into positions 
of judgment (Phelps 2004). The geography of international tribunals makes it difficult for 
the victims, their relatives, and the public to attend the trials in person, an important step 
that helps to spur recognition of the events and the victims within the local community. 
This issue is particularly acute in the case of the ICTY, whose seat in The Hague is 
thousands of kilometers from the killing fields of the former Yugoslavia. According to 
Ralph Zacklin (2004, p. 544), ÔThe physical distance that exists between the seat of the 
ICTY and the Balkan countries means that the victims and their families are denied direct 
and immediate access to the work of the Tribunal. The outreach of the ICTY to the victim 
societies has evidently failed to bridge the gap in knowledge and appreciation of its work 
at the grass-roots level.Õ The remoteness of the ICTY made it appear to be designed to 
assuage the guilt of the international community for failing to prevent the genocide, 
instead of providing Ôjustice for the communities in whose name (and on account of 
whose suffering) the tribunal had been establishedÕ (Lutz and Reiger 2009a, p. 280). 
Isolation was also a problem for the ICTR, whose proceedings occurred in 
neighboring Tanzania. The location of the court in Arusha was one of the reasons the 
Rwandan government voted against the Security Council resolution establishing the 
tribunal, despite originally pushing for its creation. In light of the problems resulting from 
distance, Ôit should hardly be a surprise if most survivors of the Rwanda genocide, and 
not merely Rwandan government officials, prefer local trialsÕ (Alvarez 1999, 403). 
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Language also presents important obstacles, since judicial procedures Ôspeak only 
in the largely inaccessible language of legal judgmentÕ (Orentlicher 2007, p. 16). Beyond 
the incomprehensibility of legal jargon, the judicial process also affects what witnesses 
can and cannot say. Unlike other mechanisms of transitional justice, which allow for the 
use of informal language and unrestrained testimony, the strict rules governing the 
conduct of legal trials offer the community a severely circumscribed record of events. 
These issues are magnified in international tribunals, where simultaneous 
translation is necessary for judges, lawyers and witnesses to interact. In the case of the 
ICTR, the proceedings slowed to a crawl as every exchange was mediated by one 
Ôoverworked translatorÕ (Darehshori 1998, A25). The need for translation also benefits 
educated elites Ð most often the accused sitting at the dock Ð because they are able to 
follow the proceedings in the original language. By inhibiting access and participation, 
international tribunals operating in a foreign language undermine the Ôgoal of building 
relationships among many different subgroups within the communityÕ (Alvarez 1999, p. 
403). 
Focusing on international tribunals as the primary location for criminal justice in 
transitional contexts also skews the subjects who are selected for prosecution. Given their 
high profile and cost, such forums have traditionally targeted Ôhigher ups,Õ arguing that 
scare resources ought to be devoted to the political leaders who bear the greatest 
responsibility for the atrocities committed. In the words of Cassese (1996, p. 241), ÔThe 
impartiality of an international tribunal, the solemnity of its proceedings and its 
appreciation that it is above political pressures, all ensure that it is equal to the task of 
judging those individuals.Õ 
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Prosecuting political leaders internationally may indeed be easier than in the local 
community. However, the decision to reserve the international tribunal for the elites who 
ordered mass killings is a moral decision, not simply one of technical expedience. In 
selectively focusing only on elite decision-makers, while letting lower level perpetrators 
walk free, the international community risks sending the signal that whoever is not 
indicted by the ICTY or ICTR is innocent (Ackerman 1992, pp. 70ff).  
By setting narrow boundaries in their choice of who to prosecute, international 
tribunals end up symbolically absolving many perpetrators by confining explicit 
responsibility for atrocities to the upper echelon of the ancien rgime. In practice, 
prosecuting leaders like often Miloševič and Kambanda does little to further justice in the 
eyes of those who suffered at their hands. Juan Mndez (1998) shows that most victims 
care more about ÔindividualizedÕ justice that acknowledges what happened to them and 
their loved ones. By focusing on the chain of command and organization of the killings, 
international proceedings do not provide affected individuals with information they care 
about most, i.e. where mass graves are located or who was involved in the killings 
(Chakravarti 2008, p. 225). 
Reserving the most high profile cases for the international criminal justice system 
also undermines local institutions. While tribunals help institutionalize the global 
accountability norm, they do little to ensure the safety and security of traumatized 
victims. These problems are particularly prevalent in Rwanda, where Ôinternational 
interests relating to trials competed directly with domestic interestsÕ (Lutz and Reiger 
2009b, p. 21). In the end, ÔThe Rwandan people have a greater interest and stake in 
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empowering their own local courts and other institutions than in protecting the credibility 
of the Security CouncilÕ (Alvarez 1999, p. 403). 
Reflecting on the relationship between the domestic and international courts 
highlights the challenges of coordinating different legal systems that have no established 
procedure for resolving disagreements over resources and jurisdiction. Although the 
Rwandan government ultimately opposed the creation of the ICTR, it had initially asked 
the international community for assistance in prosecuting its gnocidaires. The situation 
in Serbia was different, as even the leader of the opposition, Vojislav Koštunica, opposed 
MiloševićÕs extradition to The Hague. Even more shockingly, the initial indictment of 
Milošević in 1999 did not address the atrocities against individuals or ethnic communities 
in Croatia or Bosnia. Instead, it focused solely on crimes committed by the Yugoslavian 
army and police in Kosovo, which was formally part of Serbia at the time (Boarov 2001). 
Although the decision to prosecute Milošević for crimes committed by organizations he 
directly controlled as commander-in-chief may be legally sound, it undermined the 
ICTYÕs standing among his victims. 
Although most Serbs opposed international efforts to extradite Milošević, there was 
considerable support for prosecuting the former president domestically (Boarov 2001). 
Despite the deficiencies of SerbiaÕs judicial system, Emir Suljagić (2009, p. 182) 
contends that Ôit is likely that Milošević would have been found guilty of abuse of power 
if he had been tried in Belgrade. In an atmosphere in which he was seen by many in 
Serbia as the reason for the misery that had befallen them, a domestic trial would have 
made him a perfect scapegoat for the woes of the country.Õ Unfortunately, by the time he 
was indicted in Serbia in 2003, Milošević had already been turned over to The Hague in 
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exchange for international economic considerations. Instead of destroying his political 
legacy and bolstering the legitimacy of the Serbian judiciary, the international tribunal 
turned Milošević into a national hero and martyr. 
The nature of the legal regime can also generate problems for international 
tribunals. In contrast to domestic judiciaries, which operate based on a holistic legal 
architecture, international courts lack established codes of criminal procedure. These 
tribunals have to create the rules as they go along, often mixing aspects of the adversarial 
system of the Anglo-Saxon world with the continental tradition of inquisitorial justice 
(Cockayne 2005, p. 466). The ad hoc procedures adopted by international tribunals are 
often fairly lax, allowing defendants to hijack the proceedings (Lutz and Reiger 2009a, 
pp. 282-3). 
This problem is highlighted in the example of the right to self-representation. In 
February 2002 Richard May of the ICTY set an international precedent by ruling that 
Milošević could represent himself. He argued that although Ôthe defendant has a right to 
councilÉhe also has a right not to have councilÕ (International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia 2001, p. 18). While allowing defendants to serve as council in their 
own defense is part of common law, this decision confused many observers, because self-
representation is not included in the practice of Roman law. This indulgence allowed 
Milošević to make political speeches throughout the trial, instead of only when he took 
the stand, as is the case for most defendants. 
Milošević took full advantage of this opportunity, using each stage of the trial to 
address his domestic audience with presentations highlighting the devastation brought 
about by the international bombing campaign of 1999. By representing himself, 
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Milošević could sit alone at the dock, reinforcing his image as solitary patriot standing up 
to the oppression of the international community. It also allowed him to undermine the 
legitimacy and solemnity of the proceedings by Ôtreat[ing] witnesses, prosecutors, and 
judges in a manner that would earn ordinary defense council a citation or incarceration 
for contempt of courtÕ (Scharf 2005, pp. 513-4). A good speaker with a flair for the 
dramatic, Milošević soon succeeded Ôin making many impartial observers lose respect for 
the proceedingsÕ (Rieff 2006, p. 14). 
The issue of punishment poses another set of problems. As Mark Drumbl (2007, p. 
5) points out, the international communityÕs views on this issue have sought to resolve 
two contradictory imperatives. On the one hand, international lawyers have sought to 
establish that international criminal law has the capacity to judge and punish the 
perpetrators of Ôextreme evil.Õ On the other, in their attempt to integrate international 
criminal law into the standard penitentiary model of ordinary criminal law model, they 
have also moved towards the de facto abolition of capital punishment. As a result, ÔThe 
enemy of humankind is punished no differently than a car thief, armed robber, or felony 
murderer.Õ While the humanitarian desire to eliminate the death penalty is noble, it can 
seem quaint to communities that have experienced mass atrocities. This is especially true 
when these communities have no say in determining the possible scope of punishment, 
but instead have to accept the forms of punishment acceptable to Western legalist 
paradigm of international law. 
These issues came to the fore in Rwanda, whose domestic laws ensure that 
Ôcategory oneÕ perpetrators could not escape the death penalty (Cahn 1998, A3). Many 
Rwandans interpreted the Security CouncilÕs ex ante rejection capital punishment as a 
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sign of disrespect for local desires. This is yet another demonstration of the fact that 
Ôinternational tribunals are accountable to, and respond most readily to, international 
lawyersÕ jurisprudentialÉagendas and only incidentally to the needs of victims of mass 
atrocityÕ (Alvarez 1999, p. 410). Drumbl (2007, pp. 14, 18, 16) argues that international 
tribunals risk a Òdemocratic deficit by excluding local valuesÓ and by ignoring Òbottom-
up approaches to procedures and sanctions.Ó This is most obvious in the case of plea-
bargaining: ÒThe fact that plea bargains are readily available for atrocity crimes, but not 
available in many jurisdictions for serious ordinary crimes, weakens the purportedly 
enhanced retributive value of punishing atrocity crimes.Ó 
Although the ICTY and the ICTR have both completed prosecutions of high-level 
offenders, it is hard to see these verdicts as a success. Instead of bringing justice and 
promoting mutual understanding, they inhibit postwar recovery by disillusioning local 
populations and delegitimizing the international community. Although the ICTR engaged 
global actors to stabilize the situation in Rwanda Ôby denying the victims participation in 
ICTR proceedingsÉ.[it had] no impact on national reconciliation.Õ Most importantly, it 
failed to Ôcreate the needed link between the criminal and the victimÕ (Kamatali 2003, p. 
132). The same conclusions apply to the ICTY, which managed to quickly lose all its 
legitimacy in the eyes of both the Serbian and Croatian populations. Even the Bosnian 
Muslim community, which initially viewed the tribunal as a beacon of hope, came to see 
it as a Ôconfusing source of legal judgements and decisions that appear to have little 
relevance to the[ir] actual experiences, perceptions, and feelingsÕ (Saxon 2005, p. 564). 
The establishment of the ICC as a permanent tribunal has sought to address the 
issues raised by the ICTY and ICTR. For example, it has minimized some of the 
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language problems by providing a greater number of translators. The ICC has also sought 
to develop permanent legal procedures that resolve some of the discrepancies between 
common and continental law and the confusion that results. While I applaud these efforts, 
they do not go far enough in tackling the social and political problems inherent within the 
international legalist paradigm. For example, adding more translators does not address 
the fact operating in a foreign language undermines social reconciliation, nor does it 
solve the problem of what the legal forum allows witnesses to say in the first place. After 
all, ÔA vigorous cross-examination leads even the most reliable witness to a state of 
confusionÕ (Koskenniemi 2002, p. 33). 
Similarly, establishing common judicial procedures to reconcile the differences 
between common and Roman law does not address the fact that these practices remain 
rooted in Western legalism, which Ôlocate[s] the individual as the central unit of analysisÕ 
(Fletcher 2005, p. 1031). The cultural specificity of international criminal law, as well as 
its general indifference to non-European perspectives in remains problematic given that 
Ôthe operation of international criminal tribunals largely takes place outside the WestÕ 
(Drumbl 2007, p. 14). As a result, the issue of mediating between universal legal norms 
and local traditions, expectation and desires remains salient for the ICC, just as it was for 
the ICTY and ICTR. As a mechanism for stimulating renewed cooperation among 
members of warring ethnic groups Ð a measure James Meernik (2005) refers to as 
Ôsocietal peaceÕ Ð such applications of international criminal law are insufficient as 
mechanisms of historical justice. 
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Critical Response: Discursive Contextual Universalism 
The end of the Cold War resulted in a new wave of democratization in East-Central 
Europe, Africa and Latin America. Although the ideological battles of the Cold War put a 
freeze on the nascent practice of historical justice, after 1989 the international community 
revived the precedents of individual accountability set at the postwar trials in Tokyo and 
Nuremberg (Bass 2000; Minow 2002). As a result of the new global justice norm, Ôstate 
leaders have gone from being immune to accountability for their human rights violations 
to becoming the subjects of highly publicized trialsÕ (Kim 2010, p. 269). 
Building on the experiences of ICTY and ICTR, I have argued that direct, top-down 
applications of this global norm are ineffective expressions of justice in the local context. 
Although these tribunals may be successful examples of international accountability, ÔAs 
mechanisms for dealing with justice in post-conflict societies, they exemplify an 
approach that is no longer politically or financially viableÕ (Zacklin 2004, p. 545). By 
imposing outside expectations on victims and their communities, such interventions deny 
Ôthe particularity of the peoples who are making history, and the possibility that they 
might have politicsÕ (Gourevitch 1998, p. 182). 
The specter of political centralization without regard for the desires of existing 
populations has led philosophers since Immanuel Kant to reject the idea of a world state 
for fear that it would turn into Ôa soulless despotism, [which] after crushing the germs of 
goodness, will finally lapse into anarchyÕ (Kant 1991, p. 113). In response to the 
dilemmas posed by global equality and diversity, Jrgen Habermas (2001b) and Seyla 
Benhabib (2002) have developed a flexible multi-level cosmopolitanism that can 
accommodate the global imperatives of the Ôpostnational constellationÕ while remaining 
sensitive to local Ôclaims of culture.Õ Insodoing, they chart a middle course between 
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communitarians, who argue that national customs must be accommodated when they 
conflict with global norms, and global cosmopolitans, who defend the use of 
Ôinternational courts to monitor and check political and social authority of a global 
orderÉwhich no political regime or association can legitimately violateÕ (Held 1995, p. 
271). As discourse theorists, Habermas and Benhabib ground their approaches in the 
communicative interaction that occurs between the international community and local 
actors. 
Although Habermas (2001b, p. 69) observes that the stateÕs loss of Ôsteering 
capacityÕ means that the Ôconventional model [of Westphalian sovereignty] is less and 
less appropriate to the current situation,Õ he agrees with Kant that the sources of 
legitimacy for a world state are still lacking. Habermas fears that scrapping the state in 
favor of a globalized system will leave individuals in a state of anomie. Without the 
social bonds created by politics at the community level, citizens may loose the collective 
power to combat the rise of the powerful forces of the global economic system. His 
continued belief in nation-states as reservoirs of solidarity grounds his defense of their 
continued importance in international affairs. 
In order to establish a contextual universalism that respects the historical 
differences between peoples while allowing for the creation of a system powerful enough 
to meet international political problems, Habermas (2008, p. 445) reconceptualizes world 
politics in terms of a Ôdemocratically constituted world society without a world 
government.Õ He divides governance responsibilities into different levels: global legal 
requirements are determined through formal international law and informal customary 
norms, decisions about how these obligations are to be implemented and enforcement are 
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carried out by existing nation-states, while regional institutions such as the European 
Union (EU) act as meso-level intermediaries between the local and the global. In this 
system, ÔThe practices of a decentralized, multi-level politicsÉcan at least in some 
respects close the efficiency gaps that open up as the nation-state loses its autonomyÕ 
(Habermas 2001a, p. 70). 
For the purposes of this argument, I set aside the role of Ôcontinental regimesÕ in 
HabermasÕs system. I focus instead on how the Ôpostnational constellationÕ can mediate 
between global imperatives, such as the emerging justice norm, and the needs, desires 
and traditions of transitional communities. Habermas (2001a, p. 108) severely limits the 
law-making authority of the global system, arguing that it should promulgate only 
universal Ôlegal norms with an exclusively moral content.Õ Since the global justice norm 
requires only a general conception of justice under which violations of basic rights ought 
to be punished, it falls within the weak legislative prerogative of global politics. 
 Habermas (2008, p. 445) contends that this allows the international community to 
legitimately codify global legal regulations, while also remaining Ôclosely linked in the 
historical form of the constitutional state.Õ In line with his discursive understanding of 
democratic legitimacy, he (1996, p. 485) argues that popular procedures of will-formation 
must remain Ôpermeable to the free-floating values, issues, contributions, and arguments 
of a surroundingÉpublic sphere [that] functions as a normative concept.Õ Given that the 
weak global public sphere can do little more than Ônaming and shamingÕ (2008, p. 451) 
violators, the implementation of even the most basic moral obligations must remain in the 
hands of existing polities.  
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Although Habermas recognizes the normative legitimacy of universally binding 
regulations like the global justice norm, he (1998, p. 249) argues international law must 
be Ôtransformed into administratively utilizable powerÕ by opinion-formation at the state 
level. It is only by actively appropriating and accepting global legal norms that existing 
communities can legitimize them. However, despite this call for local implementation, he 
retains a belief in importance of international institutions Ð such as the ICC Ð in 
promulgating global norms and ensuring compliance within states (Baxter 2011, p. 244). 
In this sense, he agrees with Paul Seils (2016, p. 108) that the threat of prosecution by the 
ICC helps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic legal institutions. 
Habermas may well be right on this point. However, this rigid understanding of 
complementarity, the legal principle that international courts will only initiate trials after 
the state in question has demonstrated its inability or unwillingness to prosecute 
perpetrators, has the potential to politicize disputes between the international community 
and local actors (Franceschet 2012). Although the primacy of national courts is written 
into Article 17 of the Rome Statute, the founding charter of the ICC, Ôthe ProsecutorÕs 
ability to challenge a stateÕs willingness to investigate or prosecuteÉpit[s] the credibility 
of the Court against a state, whose leaders presumably will hotly deny that they are 
unwilling to prosecuteÕ (Danner 2003, p. 522). 
The disruptive potential of the complementarity principle has led Benhabib to 
modify HabermasÕs multilevel approach, giving it greater flexibility by opening it further 
to local agency. In thinking about the issue of complementarity, she (2016, pp. 112, 119, 
130) contends that Ô[p]opular sovereignty and transnational law are not antagonistic; 
rather, the latter can enhance the former.Ó Instead of conceptualizing the relationship 
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between these two levels as opposed to each other, she blurs the boundaries between 
them by calling for the international community to Ôformulat[e] core concepts of human 
rightsÕ in the form of transnational agreements, which then Ôpermit a variety of 
instantiations as concrete constitutional principles.Õ The result is Ôa dynamic 
understanding of interaction between courts, civil society and social movements.Õ This 
process results in a dialogue between levels Ð facilitated by transnational social 
movements Ð instead of a tug-of-war between international tribunals and domestic courts. 
BenhabibÕs (2006a, p. 20) argument builds on her understanding of 
cosmopolitanism as Ôa philosophical project of mediations.Õ She (1992, pp. 158-9) is able 
to reconcile universal moral equality with concrete ethical diversity by distinguishing 
between the ÔgeneralizedÕ and the ÔconcreteÕ other. The former perspective recognizes the 
humanity of the other Ôas a rational being entitled to the same rights and duties we would 
want to ascribe to ourselves.Õ By contrast, the latter acknowledges their individuality as 
human beings Ôwith a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution.Õ 
Mediating between these two viewpoints requires working at the intersection between 
general moral rules Ð such as the global justice norm Ð and concrete ethical conceptions 
of the good life, i.e. how those generalized perspectives can be applied in specific 
communities with their own traditions, histories, needs and desires. Although Benhabib 
(1992, p. 75) argues that these differences can be discursively bridged, ÔThe line between 
matters of justice and those of the good life is not given by some moral dictionary, but 
evolves as a result of historical and cultural struggles.Õ 
This insight into the struggles between individuals and movements has a number of 
implications for international criminal law. First, it emphasizes the importance of not 
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reducing Ôcosmopolitanism to a bid for imperial dominationÕ by imposing legislation on 
existing ethical communities Ð i.e. the concrete other Ð without their consent (2011, p. 3). 
Second, the discursive struggle to mediate the moral with the ethical guards against the 
tendency to regard the desires of the other as monolithic. On the contrary, Benhabib 
(2002, p. viii) emphasizes that the aspirations of the other are also Ôconstituted through 
contested practices.Õ 
The normative lesson of this insight is that discursive engagement can spur the 
concrete other to take up universal moral norms from the inside. Debate within the 
domestic public sphere allows local communities to legitimize generalized rules without 
the need for external imposition. In the process of these discursive iterations, 
Ôcosmopolitan norms are suffused with historically specific contentÕ (Benhabib 2006b, p. 
170). This not only mediates between moral norms and democratic self-determination, it 
also infuses the abstract ideals of universal rights Ôwith content drawing on experiences 
that could not have guided those rights in their initial formulationÉ open[ing] up new 
worlds and creat[ing] new meaningsÕ (Benhabib 2006b, p. 159). 
BenhabibÕs discursive cosmopolitanism shows that it is counterproductive to 
enforce abstract legal principles on transitional communities that are not ready to accept 
them. As I have shown, such imposition can disillusion victims, causing them to view 
international justice as incomplete and illegitimate. Instead of leading to an internal 
debate about past atrocities and reaffirming the human dignity of all citizens, 
international prosecutions often put the focus on the workings of an institution operating 
far away, in a foreign language, under foreign rules front and center in domestic 
discourse. 
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In considering how to reconcile democratic rule with international claims for 
justice, BenhabibÕs approach emphasizes the importance of domestic debate about global 
norms. It is only through discourse at the local level that the abstract, empty expectations 
of the weak global public presupposed by Habermas can be filled with content. Robert 
Post (2006, p. 4) points out that ÔBenhabibÕs profound insight is to conceptualize the 
emergence of cosmopolitan law as a dynamic process through which the principles of 
human rights are progressively incorporated into the positive law of democratic states.Õ 
By incorporating global principles into national criminal codes, Ôthe content of 
democratic law is progressively reconstructed along lines that reflect principles of ethical 
universalism.Õ Borrowing a term from Judith Resnik (2006), Benhabib (2007, p. 31) 
refers to this process as ÔlawÕs migration.Õ 
In addition to legitimizing international criminal law at the local level, this process 
also fosters the development of democratic culture within transitional communities. By 
engaging with international law and the requirements of human rights declarations and 
treaties, actors within nascent democracies learn Ôto enter the public sphere, to develop 
new vocabularies of public claim-making, and to anticipate new forms of justice to come 
in processes of cascading democratic iterationsÕ (2011, p. 298). Leaving decisions about 
how to punish the perpetrators of state-sponsored atrocities to the local community is also 
more likely to lead to justice. It is only if they feel that they have had a voice in this 
process that victims will be satisfied with the end result. As Michael lgnatieff (1996, p. 
114) points out, if transitional justice is to be a successful response to atrocity in terms of 
producing a truth that all sides can accept, then it Ômust be authored by those who have 
suffered its consequences.Õ 
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Focusing on justice as a local, discursive process also fosters reconciliation 
between victims and perpetrators, who have to find ways to live and make decisions 
together in the shadow of atrocity. Reaching an understanding about what happened in 
the past and making their own decisions as to how to punish perpetrators are key parts of 
transitional justice. Although these debates are contentious, they have the potential to Ôset 
in motion processes of mutual challenging, questioning, and learningÕ (Benhabib 2002, p. 
35). 
The discourse theoretic model adopted by both Habermas and Benhabib builds on 
Hans-Georg GadamerÕs (2004, p. 601) notion of a Ôfusion of horizonsÕ 
(Horizontverschmelzung). Under this model the goal of interaction between Ego and 
Alter Ð the victims and perpetrators Ð is not assimilation, but a convergence of viewpoints 
where each side learns to see the world from the perspective of the other (Habermas 
1983, pp. 189-98). The key insight of cosmopolitan discourse theory is that the 
international community should foster these debates at the local level, instead of 
imposing conceptions of justice on traumatized societies from the outside. 
 
Signs of Learning: Domestically Implemented Tribunals 
The conclusion that Ôthe enforcement of international humanitarian law cannot 
depend on international tribunals aloneÕ is hardly new (Meron 1995, p. 555). On the 
contrary, it is clear that national justice systems have a crucial role to play in transitional 
justice. However, domestic courts also face many problems prosecuting gross violations 
of human rights, particularly in the tense, distrustful atmosphere of a democratic 
transition. 
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In addition to the dichotomous choice between international tribunals or domestic 
trials, the global accountability norm has also been implemented by using locally-based 
but internationally-backed tribunals. This was the case in both the Nuremberg Trials in 
postwar Germany, and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, usually 
referred to as the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. Neil Kritz (1996, p. 131) points out, 
ÔThere is good reason why the post-World War II international prosecution of war 
criminals took place in Nuremberg and TokyoÉ. For an international tribunal to be 
maximally effective, victims and perpetrators should feel that its activities are not too far 
removed from them.Õ 
The prosecutions at Nuremberg and Tokyo faced many of the same problems as 
the ICTY and ICTR. For example, these trials also took place under international 
auspices, in a foreign language, using ad hoc rules and outside judges. They had the 
added problem of being imposed while Germany and Japan were under international 
military occupation. While this eased the problems subsequent tribunals have had in 
calling witnesses and locating evidence, it significantly increased the chances of these 
prosecutions being dismissed as ÔvictorÕs justiceÕ (Siegerjustiz). 
Despite these difficulties, the tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo are Ôthe most 
successful exampleÕ (Bass 2000, p. 5) of war crimes tribunals by almost any measure. 
Despite the unprecedented nature of holding state officials accountable for criminal 
activities that were not against the law when they were committed, three quarters of 
Germans reported that the trials were ÔfairÕ and ÔjustÕ (Breyer 1996, p. 1163). This is a far 
cry from the widespread rejection of the prosecutions carried out at the ICTY and ICTR, 
which have not succeeded in establishing a widely accepted official history of events in 
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Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia. The ICTY even failed in its most basic task of acting 
as a deterrent, as the July 1995 massacres at Srebrenica occurred after the tribunal was 
established in May 1993. 
In addition to avoiding the accusations of partiality that have plagued subsequent 
tribunals, the postwar prosecutions at Tokyo and Nuremberg were also better able to 
Ôcontribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and 
maintenance of peaceÕ (United Nations Security Council 1994, Preamble) Ð the stated 
goal of the Rwanda tribunal Ð than the trials held in the courtrooms of the ICTY and 
ICTR. In large part, this success is due to the fact that these tribunals were one part of the 
larger process of historical justice. Koskenniemi (2002, p. 6) points out that Ôcriminal 
justice has not been at the forefront of Vergangenheitsbewltigung [the struggle to 
overcome the past]Õ in these cases. On the contrary, the trials were one part of a broader, 
societal process of reconciliation. As a result, the Federal Republic and Japan are two of 
the most stable and consolidated democracies in the world today. Although Japan has not 
adequately atoned and apologized for its crimes against the Chinese and Koreans, it does 
not question the decisions of the Tokyo Tribunal (Berger 1998, p. 256). 
Reflecting on the development of policies towards human rights abusers, Pablo 
De Greiff (1998, p. 79) observes that Ôafter a period during the eighties in which pardon 
and oblivion replaced trial and punishment by an international court such as the tribunal 
at Nuremberg, we seem to be back to the Nuremberg model as a paradigm for the 
treatment of human rights criminals.Õ Unfortunately, in returning to this model the 
international community has forgotten that the primary audience of these trials is local. 
For Kritz (1996, p. 131), ÔIt is axiomatic that the weaker the connection between the 
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international operation and the local population, the easier it will be for its work to be 
ignored or dismissed as an alien effort irrelevant to concerns in the country.Õ This lesson 
was not applied to the ICTY and ICTR, nor is it clear that the situation with the ICC is 
any better in this regard. 
Despite these problems, there is still hope for international criminal justice. Many 
of the tribunals created since 2000, including the Serious Crimes Panel for East Timor, 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Indonesian Human Rights Court and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, have moved towards a mixed or 
hybrid model involving both domestic and international components. Although these 
tribunals have their own difficulties, they have taken the needs, traditions and desires of 
their local communities into account to a far greater degree than either the ICTY or the 
ICTR (Cohen 2002, pp. 1-8). 
The persistent problems of international prosecutions lead Steven Roper and 
Lilian Barria (2005, 534) to argue that on the Ôissue of reconciliation and the 
establishment of a historical record of abuses, perhaps no tribunal model is totally 
effective.Õ This sentiment is echoed by John Shattuck (in Bass 2000, p. 222), who notes, 
ÔJustice doesnÕt have to ultimately mean putting people behind bars.Õ On the contrary, in 
line with my understanding of the new Ôglobal justice normÕ as an anti-impunity norm, 
ÔSuccess is a commitment to establish the principles of accountability, getting out the 
truth.Õ 
A 2004 report from the UN Secretary General (2004) argues that Ôstrategies must 
be holistic, incorporating integrated attention to individual prosecutions, reparations, 
truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or an appropriately conceived 
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combination thereof.Õ In theorizing transitional justice, De Greiff (2012, p. 32) has sought 
to produce a philosophical justification of Ôwhy the selective application of transitional 
justice measures is misguided.Õ While a full account of De GreiffÕs conclusions lies 
beyond the scope of my argument here, what is clear is that on its own the foreign-based 
model of the international ad hoc tribunal is inadequate as a response to the global justice 
norm. 
 
Conclusion 
Drawing on my diagnosis of the shortcomings of the ICTY and ICTR, I have 
argued against the use of international tribunals to implement the emerging global justice 
norm directly. Because they are geographically, linguistically, and legally removed from 
the victims international trials are inadequate vehicles for justice. Reflecting on the ICTY 
and ICTR, it is hard to dispute Ralph ZacklinÕs (2004, p. 542) conclusion that these 
tribunals Ôwere established more as acts of political contrition, because of egregious 
failures [of the international community] to swiftly confront the situations in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, than as part of a deliberate policy, promoting international 
justice.Õ 
Let me be clear: this critique of international tribunals is not an indictment of the 
ideal of transitional justice or of international criminal law. Furthermore, my approach 
does not shift the focus away from justice towards a ÔrealistÕ focus on expediency; on the 
contrary, after centuries of impunity the rise of the global justice norm is a welcome 
development. Despite the problems facing international criminal law, it is clear that Ôthe 
treatment by states of citizens and residents within their boundaries is no longer an 
unchecked prerogative. One of the cornerstoneÕs of sovereignty, namely that states enjoy 
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ultimate authority over all objects and subjects within their circumscribed territory, has 
been delegitimized through international lawÕ (Benhabib 2006a, p. 31). 
Building on the multi-leveled international discourse theories of Habermas and 
Benhabib, I have argued that the implementation of the global justice norm Ômust take 
place above all at the local level, the village or township, in order to take rootÕ (Roht-
Arriaza 1998, p. 279). Allowing traumatized individuals within transitional societies to 
debate and collectively determine how to implement transitional justice makes this part of 
a political process of problem solving that helps to bolster communal decision-making. It 
also allows international legal norms to become part of Ôthe expression of local values 
and preferences as well as traditions of self-rule, autonomy, and continuous political 
contestationÕ (Koskenniemi 2011, p. 68). 
My argument about the importance of the local context in the implantation of 
transitional justice is not meant to overlook the problems of relying on weak or badly 
damaged local institutions in postconflict settings. In certain cases, it may indeed be 
necessary for international authorities to assist in or even oversee the implementation of 
transitional justice. However, in doing so, the international community must not forget 
that, in Judith ShklarÕs (1964, p. 81) words, ÔThe voices of the victims must always be 
heard first, not only to find out whether officially recognized social expectations have 
been denied but also to attend to their interpretations of the situation.Õ The 
implementation of the new global justice norm must serve the victims and the social 
rehabilitation of local communities, not the guilt or desires of the international 
community. 
  
 29 
 
References 
Ackerman, B.A., 1992. The future of liberal revolution. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Alvarez, J.E., 1999. Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda. Yale 
Journal of International Law, 24 (2), 365-480. 
Arendt, H., 2006. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York, 
N.Y.: Penguin Books. 
Arendt, H., and Jaspers, K., 1992. Hannah Arendt Karl Jaspers Correspondence, 1926-
1969. Translated by R. Kimber and R. Kimber, edited by L. Khler, Hans Saner. 
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Bass, G.J., 2000. Stay the hand of vengeance: the politics of war crimes tribunals. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Baxter, H., 2011. Habermas: The Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Stanford: 
Stanford Law Books. 
Beitz, C.R., 1991. Sovereignty and Morality in International Affairs. In: D. Held ed., 
Political theory today Cambridge: Polity Press, 236-254.  
Benhabib, S., 2016. The New Sovereigntism and Transnational Law: Legal Utopianism, 
Democratic Scepticism and Statist Realism. Global Constitutionalism 5 (1), 109-144. 
Benhabib, S., 2011. Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Benhabib, S., 2007. Twilight of Sovereignty Or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? 
Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times. Citizenship Studies 11 (1) (February), 19-
36. 
Benhabib, S., 2006a. The Philosophical Foundations of Cosmopolitan Norms." In 
Another Cosmopolitanism. Edited by Robert Post. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006a, . 
Benhabib, S., Reply to Commentators: Hospitality, Sovereignty, and Democratic 
Iterations. In: R. Post, ed., Another Cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 13-44. 
Benhabib, S., 2002. The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Benhabib, S., 1992. Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in 
Contemporary Ethics. New York: Routledge. 
Benhabib, S., 1986. Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical 
Theory. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Berger, T.U., 1998. Cultures of antimilitarism: national security in Germany and Japan. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Boarov, D., 2001. Serbs Await Western Aid. Institute for War and Peace Reporting, June 
29, vol. Balkan Crisis Report No. 260. 
Breyer, S., 1996. Crimes Against Humanity, Nuremberg, 1946. New York University Law 
Review, 71 (5), 1161-1164. 
Cahn, D. 1998. Justice Must Be Done. Ann Arbor News, April 24. 
Cassese, A., 2011. Reflections on International Criminal Justice. Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 9 (1), 271-275. 
 30 
Cassese, A., 1998. On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment 
of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law. European Journal of International 
Law, 9 (1), 2-17. 
Cassese, A., 1996. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law. In: L. Condorelli, A. La Rosa 
and S. Scherrer, eds., Les Nations Unies et le droit international humanitaire: actes 
du colloque international a I'occasion du cinquantieme anniversaire de I'ONU, 
Geneve, 19, 20 et 21 octobre 1995. Paris: Pedone, 230-247. 
Chakravarti, S., 2008. More than 'Cheap Sentimentality': Victim Testimony at 
Nuremberg, the Eichmann Trial, and Truth Commissions. Constellations, 15 (2), 
223-235. 
Cockayne, J., 2005. Hybrids or Mongrels? Internationalized War Crimes Trials as 
Unsuccessful Degradation Ceremonies. Journal of Human Rights, 10 (4), 455-473. 
Cohen, D., 2002. Seeking justice on the cheap: is the East Timor tribunal really a model 
for the future?. Asia Pacific Issues, 61, 1-8. 
Danner, A.M., 2003. Enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of prosecutorial 
discretion at the International Criminal Court. American Journal of International 
Law, 97 (3), 510-552. 
Darehshori, S., 1998. Inching Toward Justice in Rwanda. New York Times, 8 September, 
A25. 
De Greiff, P., 2012. Theorizing Transitional Justice. Nomos, 51, 31-77.  
De Greiff, P., 1998. International Courts and Transitions to Democracy. Public Affairs 
Quarterly, 12(1), 79-99. 
Drumbl, M.A., 2007. Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Fletcher, L.E., 2005. From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International 
Criminal Justice. Michigan Journal of International Law, 26(4), 1013-1095. 
Franceschet, A., 2012. The International Criminal Court's Provisional Authority to 
Coerce. Ethics & International Affairs, 26 (1), 93-101. 
Gadamer, H.G., 2004. Truth and method. Translated by J. Weinsheimer and D.G. 
Marshall. London: Continuum. 
Gourevitch, Philip. P., 1998. We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with 
our families: stories from Rwanda. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.  
Habermas, J., 2008. The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation 
Problems of a Constitution for World Society. Constellations, 15 (4), 444-455. 
Habermas, J., 2001a. The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy. In: 
The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays Cambridge: MIT Press, 58-112. 
Habermas, J., 2001b. The postnational constellation: political essays. M. Pensky, ed., 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Habermas, J., 1998. The inclusion of the other: studies in political theory. Trans by C. 
Cronin. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998. 
Habermas, J., 1996. Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law 
and democracy. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Habermas, J., 1983. Philosophical-political profiles. Trans. by F.G. Lawrence. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Hazan, P., 2000. La justice face  la guerre. De Nuremberg  La Haye. Paris: Stock. 
 31 
Held, D., 2002. Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty. Legal 
Theory, 8 (1), 1-44. 
Held, D., 1995. Democracy and the global order: from the modern state to cosmopolitan 
governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Honneth, A., 2004. A Social Pathology of Reason. In: F.L. Rush, ed., The Cambridge 
companion to critical theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 336-360. 
International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia, 2001. Prosecutor v. 
Milošević. Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Transcript, 30 August. 
Ignatieff, M., 1996. Articles of Faith. Index on Censorship, 25 (5), 110-122. 
Kamatali, J.M., 2003. The Challenge of Linking International Criminal Justice and 
National Reconciliation: the Case of the ICTR. Leiden Journal of International Law, 
16(1), 115-133. 
Kant, I., 1991. Kant political writings. H.S. Reiss, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kelsen, H., 1944. Peace through law. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press. 
Kim, H., and Sikkink, K., 2010. Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights 
Prosecutions for Transitional Countries. International Studies Quarterly, 54 (4), 939-
963. 
Koskenniemi, M., 2011. What Use for Sovereignty Today?. Asian Journal of 
International Law, 1 (1), 61-70 
Koskenniemi, M., 2002. Between Impunity and show Trials. Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law, 6, 1-35. 
Kritz, N.J., 1996. Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability 
Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights. Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 59 (4), 127-152. 
Kuper, A., 2004. Democracy beyond borders: justice and representation in global 
institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lamont, C.K., 2011. Reflections on Global Justice: Norm Diffusion and Strategic 
Accommodation. International Studies Review, 13 (3), 477-481. 
Lutz, E.L. and Reiger, C., 2009a. Conclusion. In: E.L. Lutz and C. Reiger, eds., 
Prosecuting heads of state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 275-294. 
Lutz, E.L. and Reiger, C., 2009a. Introduction. In: E.L. Lutz and C. Reiger, eds., 
Prosecuting heads of state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-24. 
Mrkus, G., 1980a. Four Forms of Critical Theory - Some Theses on Marx's 
Development. Thesis Eleven, 1 (1), 78-93. 
Mrkus, G., 1980b. Practical-Social Rationality in Marx: A Dialectical Critique, part 2. 
Dialectical Anthropology, 5 (1), 1-31. 
Mazower, M., 2012. Governing the world: the history of an idea. New York: The 
Penguin Press. 
Meernik, J., 2005. Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal Affects 
Societal Peace in Bosnia. Journal of Peace Research, 42 (3), 271-289. 
Mndez, J.E., 1998. The Right to Truth. In: C.C. Joyner and M.C. Bassiouni, eds., 
Reining in Impunity for International Crimes and Serious Violations of Fundamental 
Human Rights: Proceedings of the Siracusa Conference Toulouse: Ers, 255-278. 
 32 
Mendlovitz, S., and Fousek, J., 1996. The Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. In: C.B. Strozier and M. Flynn, eds., Genocide, war, and human survival 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 137-151. 
Meron, T., 1995. International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities. The American 
Journal of International Law, 89 (3), 554-577. 
Minow, M., 2002. Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair. In: N.L. 
Rosenblum, ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Olsen, T.D., Payne, L.A. and Reiter, A.G., 2010. Transitional justice in balance: 
comparing processes, weighing efficacy. Washington: United States Institute of 
Peace Press. 
Orentlicher, D.F., 2007. ÔSettling AccountsÕ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with 
Local Agency. The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1(1), 10-22. 
Pensky, M., 2008. Amnesty on Trial: Impunity, Accountability, and the Norms of 
International Law. Ethics & Global Politics, 1 (1-2), 1-40. 
Phelps, T.G., 2004. Shattered voices: language, violence, and the work of truth 
commissions. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Post, R., 2006. Introduction. In: R. Post, ed., Another Cosmopolitanism Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1-9. 
Renzo, M., 2012. Crimes Against Humanity and the Limits of International Criminal 
Law. Law and Philosophy, 31 (4), 443-476. 
Resnik, J., 2006. LawÕs Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and 
federalismÕs Multiple Ports of entry. The Yale Law Journal, 15 (7), 1564-1670. 
Rieff, D., 2006. Milošević in Retrospect: An Essay. Virginia Quarterly Review, 82 (3), 8. 
Roht-Arriaza, N., 1998. Truth Commissions as Part of a Social Process: Possible 
Guidelines. In: C.C. Joyner and M.C. Bassiouni, eds., Reining in impunity for 
international crimes and serious violations of fundamental human rights: 
proceedings of the Siracusa conference, 17-21 September 1998. Toulouse: Ers, pp. 
279-84. 
Roper, SD., and Barria, L.A., 2005. Assessing the Record of Justice: A Comparison of 
Mixed International Tribunals versus Domestic Mechanisms for Human Rights 
Enforcement. Journal of Human Rights, 4 (4), 521-536. 
Rožič, P., and Nisnevich, Y.A., 2016. Lustration Matters: a Radical Approach to the 
Problem of Corruption. Studies in Comparative International Development, 51 (3), 
257-285 
Saxon, D., 2005. Exporting Justice: Perceptions of the ICTY Among the Serbian, 
Croatian, and Muslim Communities in the Former Yugoslavia. Journal of Human 
Rights, 4 (4), 559-572. 
Scharf, M.P., 2005. The Perils of Permitting Self-Representation in International War 
Crimes Trials. Journal of Human Rights, 4 (4), 513-520. 
Schwan, G., 1998. Political Consequences of Silenced Guilt. Constellations, 5 (4), 472-
491. 
Seils, P., 2016. Handbook on Complementarity: An Introduction to the Role of National 
Courts and the ICC in Prosecuting International Crimes. New York: International 
Center for Transitional Justice. 
Shklar, J.N., 1964. Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
 33 
Sikkink, K., 2011. The justice cascade: how human rights prosecutions are changing 
world politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 
Sriram, C.L., 2003. Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses. 
American University International Law Review, 19 (2), 310-429. 
Suljagić, E., 2009. Justice Squandered? The Trial of Slobodan Milošević. In: E.L. Lutz 
and C. Reiger, eds., Prosecuting heads of state. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 176-204. 
Tooze, A., 2014. The deluge: the Great War and the remaking of global order 1916-
1931. London: Allen Lane.  
UN Secretary General, 2004. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies. S/2004/616, August 23. 
United Nations Security Council, 1994. Resolution 955 Establishing the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda (with Annexed Statute). UN Doc. S/RES/955. 
Vinjamuri, L., 2010. Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of International Justice. 
Ethics & International Affairs, 24 (2), 191-211.  
Williams, B., 2006. Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline. A.W. Moore, ed., Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Zacklin, R., 2004. The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals. Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2(2), 541-545. 
 
